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Affirmative Action Programs: Is the “Sun Setting” on Racial 
Preferences?
Sean R. Smallwood
Affirmative Action programs originally were meant to create equal 
opportunities for historically marginalized students across institu-
tions in the post-Civil Rights era (Backes, 2012; Kellough, 2006). 
Administrators in the United States grapple with the implementa-
tion of  programs to increase the number of  women and students of  
color into colleges and universities. The legality of  these programs are 
under scrutiny; the Supreme Court heard two cases in 2013 involving 
affirmative action programs (Jaschik, 2013a). One involved the 
University of  Texas when they denied Abigail Fisher admission in 
2008. Another involved the state of  Michigan barring state universi-
ties and colleges from considering issues such as race or ethnicity in 
admissions. This article takes a legal standpoint of  the development 
of  the Supreme Court’s stance on affirmative action and explores 
policy implications.  
Since the end of  the Civil Rights Era, institutions across the nation have grappled 
with how best to enhance educational opportunities for historically marginalized 
groups such as women and racial or ethnic minorities (Kellough, 2006).   Over 
the years, as the courts changed leadership, the signals from these government 
entities shifted.   Now with recent events involving both the states of  Texas and 
Michigan, higher education professionals are at a crossroads in understanding 
how to best approach admissions policies.   In response to challenges regarding 
policies many states began to ban public institutions from considering race in 
their admissions programs (Backes, 2012).   
The Supreme Court has not been able to provide a clear formula for how to ap-
proach these issues.   The judges struggle to discern whether affirmative action 
is an appropriate measure, or a specific case is constitutional (Marlowe, 2011). 
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There are various implications for administrators and campus communities 
across the nation, and the development of  this policy issue will drastically change 
the landscape of  who has access to American higher education.   In a continually 
diversifying world it is important for student affairs professionals to create cam-
pus environments that mirror accurate representation of  racial demographics in 
the United States.   
Examining the Supreme Court’s decisions over the past several decades provides 
some insight into how this policy issue has and will develop.   Spann (2000) ar-
gues, “[i]n the early years, the Supreme Court gave qualified support to the con-
cept of  racial affirmative action, but in recent years, a majority of  the Court has 
consistently opposed affirmative action programs” (p. 1).   This article explores 
the different eras of  affirmative action as it applies to higher education admis-
sions criteria, how Supreme Court judges have grappled with the different issues 
presented, and what signals they have left for institutions to approach these situa-
tions in the future.   As we begin to reach what the Court has deemed as a “critical 
mass” (Grutter v. Bollinger et al., 2003) we will observe the decline of  race based 
affirmative action in exchange for a more race-neutral alternative.  
The Emergence of  Affirmative Action Programs
During the Civil Rights Era courts were faced with many questions concerning 
race relations.   As each area of  the country had its own approach, the Supreme 
Court felt it necessary to intervene.   Prior to this time period the Supreme Court 
provided no clear guidance on how to approach these situations.   Scholars argue 
that in cases concerning United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938), Skinner v. State 
of  Oklahoma, ex. rel. Williamson (1942), and Korematsu v. United States (1944) the 
Court was able to pave the way for some standard of  review.   However, the land-
mark case of  Brown v. Board of  Education1 (1954) stands as the true turning point 
(Marlowe, 2011).   The Court began telling states and local entities to stop using 
race or ethnicity as a means to racially segregate students.    Racial affirmative 
action is more broadly defined as, “the race-conscious allocation of  resources—
resources such as jobs, educational opportunities, and voting strength—that is 
motivated by an intent to benefit racial minorities” (Spann, 2000, p. 3).   
Following the Brown v. Board (1954) decision, lawmakers were encouraged and 
supported by the Court to create racial remedies, and through a series of  execu-
tive orders by John F.   Kennedy institutions of  learning began using race-con-
scious policies as a means to combat former constitutional violations        (Spann, 
2000).   Simply put, “[a]ffirmative action developed as a means of  combating 
such discrimination and its effects” (Kellough, 2006, p. 145).   Policymakers and 
1 Further referred to as Brown v. Board.
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administrators alike enacted programs that used race-based pupil assignments 
and cross-city busing systems to achieve a more racially balanced education sys-
tem (Spann, 2000).   
Fifteen years later the Court heard the first challenge to affirmative action pro-
grams in higher education with DeFunis v. Odegaard (1974).   The Court avoided 
making a judgment by claiming that the issue was moot given that DeFunis was 
about to graduate law school from a different institution.   This case in particular 
was a clear indication of  two things—growing contention amongst the greater 
society, and a Court “unable to agree upon anything other than the contentious-
ness of  the affirmative action issue” (Spann, 2000, p. 14).   The Court findings 
were a sign of  growing discomfort and eventual backlash of  affirmative action 
policies.  
Rising Contention Against Affirmative Action
Regents of  the University of  California v. Bakke
Leading up to the Regents of  the University of  California v. Bakke 2(1978) decision, 
many institutions began using quota systems as a means to increase the number 
of  students of  color in their campus communities (Kellough, 2006).   In this 
instance Allan Bakke, a White student, was denied admission to the University 
of  California (U.C.)—Davis, School of  Medicine, “while African-American stu-
dents with lower qualifications (as measured by the University) were admitted” 
(Kellough, 2006, p.100).   This was due to a quota system backed by University 
officials that set aside 16 seats for students of  color.   The Court was split and 
failed to come to a majority decision.   As Marlowe (2011) states:
With no majority opinion in any direction, a total of  five justices believed 
that affirmative action programs could be constitutionally acceptable under 
the right circumstances, five felt that the U.C. Davis program in particular 
was impermissible, and one advocated applying the same strict scrutiny anal-
ysis to affirmative action programs that the Court applied to classifications 
that disadvantaged minorities. (p. 102)
This split would later create difficulties for institutions to find constitutional ad-
missions criteria, but ultimately the decision laid the framework by which we 
evaluate cases concerning race-based programs today.   
The decision of  the case was in favor of  Bakke and the Court held that he should 
be admitted into the medical school.   The Court also struck down the use of  
quota systems and sent a message to institutions that they must find a narrowly 
tailored plan to diversify their student populations (Kellough, 2006; Marlowe, 
2  Further referred to as Regents v. Bakke.
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2011; Perry, 2007; Spann, 2000).   Justice Powell advocated for a review of  “strict 
scrutiny” 3 he provided a prelude for the argument that these programs must 
prove a compelling government interest in giving preferential treatment to dif-
ferent classifications of  persons.   Also the policies must be narrowly tailored to 
meet those interests (Regents of  the University of  California v. Bakke, 1978).   Follow-
ing the Regents v. Bakke (1978) decision, lower courts often clarified and applied 
strict scrutiny.   It was not until the new millennium that the Court heard another 
affirmative action case directly involving higher education.   
Gratz and Grutter v.  Bollinger et al.  
Leading up to the landmark decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger et al. 4 (2003) and Grutter 
v. Bollinger et al.  5 (2003), lower courts struggled to reconcile next steps regard-
ing affirmative action programs.   State governments began proposing pieces 
of  legislation that would invalidate affirmative action programs.   As Kellough 
(2006) writes:
[i]n the mid- to late 1990s, a number of  Republican members of  Congress 
urged passage of  a “civil rights bill” that would end federal government 
affirmative action efforts… as many as fifteen states had the issue placed 
on their legislative agendas in 1997, at a time when anti-affirmative action 
rhetoric was reaching a high point.  (p. 57)
In 2003 the Court agreed to hear two cases involving the University of  Michigan’s 
(UM) admissions process.   Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both applied 
for undergraduate admission to UM and both were denied admittance.   Similarly, 
Barbara Grutter applied to UM’s Law School and was also denied admittance.   In 
these cases the court attempted to clarify what was and what was not permissible 
in affirmative action policies.   
The undergraduate admissions policy at UM gave students of  color a certain 
point total towards their application that would ultimately guarantee their ad-
mission to the University.   Many White applicants were turned away as a result 
(Marlowe, 2011).   When the 6-3 decision came down in favor of  Gratz and 
Hamacher it was clear what stance the Court was taking at that time.   As Perry 
(2007) summarizes: 
Justice Powell in Bakke had required individual assessment of  applicants, 
and he demanded that no single characteristic in a candidate’s file should 
determine admission.   UM’s review of  applications was not individualized, 
3  Strict scrutiny standard of  review is used by the Court to review cases that involve racial discrimi-
nation. It holds that an entity must have a compelling interest for taking race into consideration and 
the process must be narrowly tailored to meet that interest.
4  Further referred to as Gratz v. Bollinger.
5  Further referred to as Grutter v. Bollinger.
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and admissions officers’ option of  “flagging” applications for additional re-
view could not save the policy from its illegal flaws. (pp.150-151) 
The difference manners in which the candidates were reviewed divided the Court 
(Kellough, 2006; Marlowe, 2011; Perry, 2007).   Separating out candidates based 
on racial or ethnic status is impermissible (Gratz v. Bollinger et al., 2003; Grutter v. 
Bollinger et al., 2003).   
In Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) the Court affirmed UM’s law school admission policy. 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, held that the plan was narrowly tai-
lored to meet the institution’s interest of  diversity, and that individuals were eval-
uated in a way where race or ethnicity was not the predominating factor (Grutter 
v. Bollinger et al, 2003).   The majority upheld what Justice Powell had previously 
ascertained in Regents v. Bakke (1978), creating a diverse student body was still a 
compelling government interest.   The justices also asserted that strict scrutiny 
applies in cases involving race-based discrimination (Kellough, 2006), but one of  
the more interesting pieces was the concept of  “critical mass” and how it sets the 
stage to end race-conscious affirmative action programs.    
The term “critical mass” is derived from the opinion Justice Powell gave in the 
Regents v.  Bakke (1978) decision when he was discussed the Harvard Model—
achieving “meaningful numbers” of  students of  color in order to avoid leaving 
underrepresented students feeling isolated (Regents of  the University of  California 
v. Bakke, 1978).   Justice O’Connor in the Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) opinion also 
writes:
[w]e take the Law School at its word that it… will terminate its race-con-
scious admissions program as soon as practicable.   It has been 25 years 
since Justice Powell first approved the use of  race to further the interest in 
student body diversity in the context of  public higher education.   Since that 
time, the number of  minority applicants with high grades and tests scores 
has indeed increased.   We expect that 25 years from now, the use of  racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved to-
day.   (pp. 341-342)
This quote essentially sets a timer, or what many people call a “sunset” period 
when race-conscious affirmative action will no longer be of  use (White, 2013).    
These two decisions represent a growing divide among the justices, and a change 
in jurisprudence is occurring.   As Marlowe (2011) surmises, “[t]his regime pe-
riod follows the life cycle pattern of  initially struggling to establish a governing 
doctrine… then showing some signs of  deterioration” (p. 128).   What Marlowe 
is highlighting is the ebb and flow of  ideological difference among justices in the 
Court.   As new presidential appointments are made, the standards will change 
depending upon how the justices view the legal applicability of  race-conscious 
affirmative action programs.   The University of  Texas (UT) case this past year 
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was closely watched because it could have either reaffirmed the Gratz v. Bollinger 
and Grutter v. Bollinger decisions, or created a new era for evaluating affirmative 
action programs in higher education.   
Recent Issues Before the Court
Fisher v. University of  Texas at Austin
UT and many institutions around the nation began changing their admissions 
process dramatically after 2003.   UT adopted a plan that would allow the top 
10% of  Texas high school graduates automatic admission to their University. 
The program was expected to meet the institution’s diversity goals because many 
Texas high schools enroll predominantly students of  color (Carey, 2012; Jaschik, 
2013a; White, 2013).   Along with the top 10%, each student had a calculated 
index (otherwise known as the “Personal Achievement Index”) that generated a 
score for each applicant based on a consideration of  six factors.   Among those 
six factors, in the “special circumstances” section, race could be one of  the con-
siderations (White, 2013).   Leading up to the Fisher v. University of  Texas at Austin 
6  (2013) case several other decisions came down previewing how the Court was 
evolving on the issue of  race-conscious programs.   Carey (2012) recalls, “Rob-
erts wrote that ‘the way to stop discrimination on the basis of  race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of  race’” (para. 2).   This was a popular sentiment 
from other justices serving on the Court and represented a growing disagreement 
regarding affirmative action programs.   Kellough (2006) argues that many people 
felt that discrimination was no longer an issue for women and People of  Color. 
In the case of  Fisher v. UT, the two categories were pitted against each other.   
Abigail Fisher, a White woman, in 2008 applied for undergraduate admission at 
UT’s flagship campus in Austin.   After UT denied Fisher admission, she filed 
a lawsuit claiming that the institution’s consideration of  race in their admissions 
policy was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause (Tilsley, 2012). 
While Fisher did not prevail in the lower courts in asserting her claim, the Su-
preme Court decided to hear the case upon her appeal.   The decision by the 
Court in June 2013 found that the Fifth Circuit had not applied “strict scrutiny” 
to UT’s policies, but failed to offer a “definitive opinion on whether colleges may 
consider the use of  race in admissions” (Jaschik, 2013b, para. 1).   The Court as-
serted that, under certain circumstances, relying on an applicant’s racial or ethnic 
identity is acceptable, but could not rule on UT’s policy without sending it back 
to the lower federal court (Jaschik, 2013b; White, 2013).   Even after a decade of  
the Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) and Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), decision the court has 
not fully come to a consensus on how to approach affirmative action in 
6  Further referred to as Fisher v. UT
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American higher education.  However, the ruling still conveys that diversity is a 
compelling government interest.   
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action
The newest case to be considered by the Court is one involving a measure that 
was passed by Michigan voters in 2006 (Proposition 2) that would not allow pub-
lic universities to consider race or sex in admissions decisions (Jaschik, 2013a). 
This vote resembles many other bans by other states, such as California, and has 
exponential legal ramifications across the nation.   Jaschik (2013a) writes, “the 
Sixth Circuit—in two rulings… found that proposition 2 was unconstitutional. 
But those rulings have been stayed, pending this appeal” (para.3).   This case 
raises an entirely different question—whether or not is it lawful for legislative 
bodies to prohibit the use of  race or ethnicity in admissions.   The question is 
fundamentally different from the Fisher v. UT case, but both speak to the larger 
issue (White, 2013).   Fisher v. UT (2013) asks if  affirmative action violates Equal 
Protection, and the Michigan case asks whether a ban on affirmative action vio-
lates Equal Protection (White, 2013).   In the coming months it will be interesting 
to see whether the Court makes a definitive statement on affirmative action or 
chooses to dodge the issue entirely.   
Conclusion
Affirmative action has changed considerably since the era of  Regents v. Bakke 
(1978).   Yet in every Court ruling diversity is a compelling interest by institutions 
and satisfies the first test of  the strict scrutiny standard (Jaschik, 2013b; White, 
2013).   Admissions policies change to meet the requirements set by the Court, 
and there is an observable shift as the Court is requiring more institutions to look 
at race-neutral alternatives.   As Justice O’Connor mentioned in the Grutter v. Bol-
linger (2003) decision, the time of  race-conscious affirmative action is coming to 
an end.   Many higher education professionals and commentators have advocated 
for the use of  socio-economic status as a new way to create diverse student pop-
ulations (The Century Foundation, 2012; Kahlenberg, 2013).   The Court’s deci-
sion is critical moving forward because “[i]f  the Court instead requires universi-
ties to use race-neutral alternatives… the effect would be to flip the emphasis 
so that class counts a great deal and race counts very little” (Kahlenberg, 2013). 
The “sun is setting” on the post Regents v. Bakke (1978) style of  affirmative action. 
This marks the dawning of  a new era that is more focused on socio-economic 
status as a tool to create diverse populations on college campuses.    
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